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Abstract 
Despite its limitations, the CAPM is a popular asset pricing model. However, the estimation 
of beta in the CAPM is affected by the choice of the returns frequency and firm 
characteristics. This study undertakes a detailed examination of the evidence for the UK and 
we find that the differences in beta computed from returns of various frequencies are related 
to size, liquidity, book-to-market and to some degree, opacity factors. One area where our 
conclusions might have important implications is in the regulatory use of the CAPM. Our 
results imply that low frequency beta estimates should, in most cases, be preferred to high 
frequency beta estimates. 
1. Introduction 
Whilst the CAPM has been subject to considerable criticism (most recently by Dempsey 
[2013a], who catalogues the empirical failings of the model), the model retains a core role in 
modern finance.   
Whether or not this is desirable is clearly debateable. One can argue, as in Dempsey (2013a, 
2013b), Cai, Clatcher and Keasey (2013) and Moosa (2013) that it is time to move on to 
another paradigm altogether, or one can argue the case for an alternative factor model, such 
as the Fama-French model (Fama and French, 1993, 1996) or some form of conditional asset 
pricing model (Durack, Durand and Maller, 2004; Fletcher and Kihanda, 2005; Schrimpf, 
Schröder and Stehle, 2007). Alternatively, one can adopt the position of Brown and Walter 
(2013) and Smith and Walsh (2013) that the CAPM is defensible, and indeed according to the 
latter, despite being “half right” is “the only game in town”.  Whatever one’s views on this, 
pragmatically it is hard to disagree with Partington (2013) who predicts that “the reign of the 
CAPM is unlikely to end anytime soon”.   
Discussions of the techniques of beta estimation, the suitability of alternative analogues for 
beta and the treatment of leverage in deriving asset betas are standard fare in both textbooks 
and regulatory reports. Early research also considered issues such as the effects of non-
synchronous trading (Dimson 1979, Scholes and Williams, 1977) and intertemporal 
parameter stability (Blume, 1971, 1975).  In relation to the influence of the return frequency 
on beta estimation, an early work by Levhari and Levy (1977) showed that the impact on beta 
of lengthening the investment horizon (i.e. the return frequency) depends on the riskiness of 
stock. They find that the systematic risk (β) of defensive stocks tends to decline while for 
aggressive stocks tends to increase with increases in investment horizon. Wood and McInish 
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(1985) however, note that the results of Levhari and Levy (1977) are possibly affected by 
non-synchronous trading.  Cohen et al. (1980) show that the effect of the decreasing of the 
return frequency may depend on the severity of thin trading problems.  An added 
complication is the phenomenon known as “reference-day risk” (Acker and Duck, 2007).  
They find that, when using monthly returns, the choice of the reference day i.e. the particular 
day of the month and following month on the basis of which the monthly returns are 
calculated (difference in prices between those two days) affects estimates of the properties of 
monthly returns including the betas estimated from those returns. These effects exist for both 
individual stocks and market indices.  They further note that the reference-day risk is a 
variant of sampling variation, albeit the effect of which had been previously underestimated.  
 
Reinganum (1982) considers whether the size effect (Banz, 1981) is affected by the estimate 
of risk, and finds that that the size effect is driven by underestimated risk and that the effect is 
larger when the risk is estimated using returns measured over shorter intervals. Hawawini 
(1983) finds that betas estimated on the basis of daily, weekly or monthly returns vary 
substantially and in particular, that for firms with market values less than the average market 
value of all firms, the beta will decrease when the interval is shortened, while the opposite is 
observed for firms with market values greater than the average market value of all firms. 
Handa, Kothari, and Wasley (1989) specifically consider firm size and show that portfolio 
betas of small (large) market capitalisation firms rise (fall) as the return frequency is 
decreased.  
As discussed above, much of the early literature that considered the effect of returns 
frequency on beta estimation has focussed on trading frictions and non-synchronous trading 
as potential explanations for the differences in betas estimated using different return intervals. 
Apart from a few exceptions, there appears to have been relatively less interest in 
investigating what firm-specific characteristics, apart from size and liquidity, might influence 
the way in which beta estimates vary with the frequency of their estimation. We add to this 
literature by considering how opacity (Gilbert et al., 2014), in addition to other firm 
characteristics such as size, leverage, BE/ME, illiquidity and industry affiliation are related to 
the betas estimated using different frequency returns. 
Gilbert et al. (2014), show that estimates of beta are frequency-dependent, and that 
differences between high and low frequency betas can be explained by proxies for opacity of 
the firm.  Opaqueness creates uncertainty about the effect of systematic news on the firm and 
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this uncertainty affects how quickly such information is impounded into the prices. This, 
coupled with the risk averseness of investors, affects the returns of opaque firms at higher 
frequencies. At lower frequencies however, the effect of the systematic news is reflected in 
the returns of all firms (Gilbert et al., 2014). The consequence is that high frequency betas are 
particularly problematic in that they do not fully reflect risk characteristics.  By contrast, low 
frequency betas will not suffer from this difficulty. Consequently, for opaque firms, using 
shorter return intervals results in a beta estimate that does not accurately reflect the riskiness 
of the stock. We add to the Gilbert et al. (2014) investigation in two ways.  First, we consider 
whether other firm-specific risk factors such as gearing (leverage) and BE/ME apart from 
opacity, might make it more difficult to quickly interpret the impact of systematic news on 
the firm. Additionally, we consider whether these risk factors have explanatory power in the 
presence of controls for industry membership. Second, in addition to investigating the 
differences between high and low frequency betas, as in Gilbert et al. (2014), we also run the 
F-test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989, hereafter GRS) in order to check whether or not 
the pricing errors from the CAPM at each beta frequency are jointly zero.  
While the academic debate continues on the how best to estimate the parameters of the 
CAPM, in practice the CAPM is widely used. Evidence from surveys of practitioners, for 
example, Graham and Harvey, 2001; Brounen, De Jong and Koedijk, 2004:  McLaney, 
Pointon and Tucker, 2004: Coleman, Maheswaran and Pinder, 2008), suggest that the CAPM 
is the preferred model for cost of equity computations. In relation to the regulatory use of the 
CAPM, in the UK, the CAPM is the only model currently accepted by the regulatory 
authorities.  These include the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), Ofcom, Ofwat, 
Ofgem and the CAA.
1
 The implication of this widespread use of the CAPM in the regulation 
of utilities is that fairly small variations in beta can have a very large economic impact when 
multiplied by the CAPM risk premium. For example, Buckland, Williams and Beecher 
(2015) cite an Ofwat report that  “in the case of water, it has been estimated that a 0.5 
percentage point variation in the cost of capital might translate into a change of £10.00 in the 
average annual bills of the 28 million households served by water companies in England and 
Wales (Ofwat, 2014: 2).”  With a market risk premium of 5%, such a variation is equivalent 
                                                          
1
 In the UK, monopoly utility services are subject to price regulation: telecommunications access prices are set 
by Ofcom, water and sewerage prices are set by Ofwat, electricity and gas network prices are set by Ofgem and 
monopoly airport landing charges are set by the CAA in conjunction with the CMA.  The CMA has the role of 
being the appeals body for the regulated utility companies.  Additionally, it has a key role in undertaking market 
investigations.  For a full description see: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-
markets-authority (last accessed 4th April 2016). 
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to a change of only 0.1 in the estimate of the beta for a firm financed entirely by equity.  Not 
surprisingly, regulated firms invest heavily in consultants and academics who argue the case 
for variations in the beta estimates, and regulatory bodies often employ others who argue for 
variations in the other direction.
2
  Consequently, research that objectively establishes how 
beta should be estimated has important policy implications and considerable economic 
impact. Whilst Gilbert et al. (2014) have analysed the position in the USA, given that in the 
UK regulators have expressed a preference for higher frequency returns over lower frequency 
returns in estimating betas, our study using UK data is potentially of added practical 
importance as it provides an out of (US)sample test. Additionally, we have a much longer run 
of data for the UK than for the other countries where Sudarsanam et al. (2011) show that the 
CAPM is the preferred model used by regulators.  
The first objective of this paper is, therefore, to examine whether firm betas vary with the 
frequency of estimation in the UK.  The second objective is to examine whether any 
differences in beta estimated using low versus high return frequencies can be explained.  If 
they can be explained, and the explanatory variables can be construed as proxies for omitted 
systematic risk variables, then the implication is that some frequency estimates may be under-
stating the true beta.  The third objective is to examine the evidence on whether beta 
estimation frequency has an impact on asset pricing tests of the CAPM.  
Consistent with previous evidence, we find that there are systematic differences in betas 
estimated from low versus high frequency returns. Additionally, we find that the differences 
in beta estimates from using returns of various frequencies are related to size, illiquidity, 
opacity and industry affiliation in general, but there are some variations across size and 
illiquidity subsamples. We show that for all but the largest group of companies, lower 
frequency beta estimates are preferable to higher frequency estimates. For the largest group 
of companies, the evidence suggests that either one could be used. We also provide limited 
but corroborative evidence through a time series asset pricing test of the CAPM that lower 
frequency estimates are preferable to higher frequency estimates.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 Note that in the UK, cost of capital is an important parameter in market investigations.  The UK’s approach to 
such investigations differs from that in many other countries.  See, for example, the UK and Australian positions 
set out in the OECD paper on excessive prices: http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/49604207.pdf (last 
accessed 4th April 2016). 
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2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
To construct our sample, we deliberately exclude small firms for three reasons.  First, it is 
well-known that smaller stocks suffer from thin trading problems (Dimson, 1979). Including 
such stocks in our test portfolios would effectively be loading the experiment in favour of 
finding that high frequency betas are problematic. To avoid this problem, we limit our 
portfolios to the top 30% of firms by market capitalisation. Secondly, in pragmatic terms, the 
regulators discussed above are typically concerned with larger firms rather than smaller ones.  
To the extent that small firms are regulated, they are typically subsidiaries of larger firms
3
.  
Finally, we know that asset pricing models for the UK perform more successfully when 
limited to larger firms (Gregory, Tharyan and Christidis, 2013) and that pricing small value 
stocks in particular is a general challenge for asset pricing models (Fama and French, 2012).   
 
All our estimates use the longest data period available.  Our major restriction is the 
availability of returns data on The London Share Price Database (LSPD) daily database.  To 
run our regressions, we need a sufficient run of data to estimate monthly betas
4
 using five 
years’ of returns data from the monthly LSPD, 250 trading days of data to estimate daily beta, 
and 104 weeks to estimate the weekly betas.  Additionally, we need lagged values of our 
opacity measure (which are formed using the accounting data described below), market 
capitalisation, liquidity, book equity to market equity and gearing/leverage. The Gilbert et al. 
(2014) measure of opacity (based on the Jones 1991 model) can only be measured at annual 
intervals, so that the only betas we run regressions for are those calculated six months after 
the financial year end. 
These requirements mean that our first regression to explain the difference between monthly, 
weekly and daily beta estimates can be run in 1988, and the final regression in 2013. The 
month within the year that we start is affected by the availability of accounting data needed to 
estimate our measure of opacity (which is based on the Jones 1991 model) and the way we 
form our book-to-market portfolios for the GRS test portfolios.  Following Fama and French 
(1996), it has become standard practice to allow at least 6 months between the financial year 
end (FYE) and the portfolio formation date.  Because of the prevalence of March year 
                                                          
3
 For example, in the 2010 Bristol Water appeal case to the UK’s Competition Commission, although the 
appellant was a small firm, and treated as such by the CC, it was actually a subsidiary of a large multi-national. 
4
 In unreported results, we also estimate quarterly betas using ten years’ of returns data from the monthly LSPD 
files. These results are available from the authors on request. 
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financial year ends in the UK, we follow Gregory et al. (2013) and use end-September 
portfolio formation dates for UK firms.  
In order to maintain the inter-temporal consistency of the beta estimates, our monthly betas 
use 60 months of data, ending in September, whilst our weekly beta estimates use 104 weeks 
of data ending on the 40th week, and the daily estimates use 250 trading days of data ending 
in the same week, which we refer to as the Conventional Estimation Period results, the 
terminology coming from the approaches typically used by regulators and academic 
researchers.
5
  These calculations are then repeated each year such that we have estimates of 
monthly, weekly and daily betas for the period 1988-2013 for the UK.  If any observations 
are missing such that a beta cannot be estimated for a particular date-frequency, we drop that 
firm-date observation from the sample for all frequencies.    
We also compute the monthly, weekly and daily betas over a common five year horizon, 
which we refer to as the Common Estimation Period results.  Although this is not normally 
done in regulation, as one of the arguments regulators use to justify high frequency 
estimation is “up to datedness”, examining such betas may help in determining whether any 
differences are due to estimation frequency in its strictest sense. 
Our market returns is the total return on the FT All-Share Index and the risk-free rate of 
return is the 3-month Treasury Bill Rate. The firm returns are from LSPD and firm level 
accounting variables are from Datastream. 
2.2 Beta Estimation 
We estimate betas by running OLS, time series regressions of the form:  
 
 Rit − Rft =αi +βi (Rmt-Rft) + εit (1) 
 
Where Rit is the return on the stock i for period t, Rft is the risk-free rate, and Rmt is the return 
on the market portfolio. To avoid outliers unduly influencing the regression tests for 
differences in beta, we drop any observations where the differences between the high and low 
frequency betas are in the extreme percentiles of the distribution.   
 
 
2.3 Liquidity Measures 
                                                          
5
 Though of course we concede that other estimation periods can be used and are equally valid. 
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 For liquidity we consider three measures.  The first is the Amihud illiquidity ratio, Ait (scaled 
by one million), from Amihud (2002), calculated over the prior year ending September. We 
Winsorise this measure at the 1% level.   This measure captures the average daily price 
response associated with one currency unit of trading volume and is defined as: 
 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 =
1
𝐷𝑡
∑
|𝑅𝑖𝑑𝑡|
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑑𝑡
   (2) 
Where Ridt is the return on stock i for day d of year t, VOLidt is the daily volume in the local 
currency unit on stock i for day d of year t and Dt is the total number of trading days in year t.  
However, there is a problem with this measure of illiquidity as the return to volume ratio (the 
summed term on the RHS) is inevitably influenced by the size of the firm.  It further ignores 
the frequency of trading.  These limitations motivate Florackis, Gregoriou and Kostakis 
(2011) to develop an alternative measure, based on what they term a “return to turnover 
ratio”, TRidt, defined as the stock’s daily trading volume divided by the number of shares 
outstanding.  Formally, the measure is: 
 
𝑅_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
1
𝐷𝑡
∑
|𝑅𝑖𝑑𝑡|
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑑𝑡
 (3) 
We use R_to_TR as our main measure of illiquidity.  Florackis et al. (2011) show this 
measure to be free of size bias in the UK and we also find that it has a lower correlation with 
size in our data. Additionally, we find it has better explanatory power in our regression tests.  
Nonetheless, in unreported robustness checks
6
, we obtain broadly similar conclusions when 
the Amihud measure is used.  Finally, following Gilbert et al. (2014) we investigated a third 
measure of liquidity, the trading volume per year per share outstanding (turnover), which, in 
common with the R_to_TR measure, we Winsorised at the 1% level.  As we find we get 
lower R-squareds in regressions using this measure of liquidity, we treat it as a robustness 
check only and do not report results using this measure.  Our key results are unaffected by the 
use of this measure in place of R_to_TR and similarly are unaffected by including both 
measures simultaneously, despite the obvious (negative) correlation between the measures.  
 
2.4 Opacity Measure 
Our proxy for opacity is a measure based on discretionary (abnormal) accruals computed 
using a modified Jones (1991) model. This measure reflects accruals management and works 
as a good proxy for firm opacity. As Bradshaw, Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian (2009 p.69) 
notes “Considerable evidence indicates that accruals management obscures at least some 
                                                          
6
 Available from the authors on request 
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information about firm fundamentals (see, e.g., Sloan, 1996) and is thus a direct, firm-
specific measure of opacity. In addition, aggressive earnings management is likely to proxy 
for management’s general proclivity to hide information from the capital market and thus 
captures less easily quantifiable or observable aspects of opacity”.  
 
The model that we use follows Mouselli, Jaafar and Goddard (2013) and our specific measure 
of opacity is the absolute value of abnormal accruals, which is the absolute value of the 
discretionary component of total current accruals. The total current accrual for each firm 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 is defined as  
 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 = (∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠h𝑖𝑡) − (∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡) (4) 
Where, ∆CAit is the change in current assets, ∆Cashit is the change in cash and short-term 
investment,  ∆CLit is the change in current liabilities and ∆STDit is the change in short-term 
debt.  
 
We then run a cross-sectional OLS regression across all the firms in each industry for each 
year with the following specification and obtain industry year specific estimates of  𝛼1 and 
𝛼2. 
 
(
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) = 𝛼1 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
where, TAit−1 is lagged total assets, ∆REVit is the change in revenue.  
Since this approach estimates an annual cross-sectional industry level model, it has the 
advantage of avoiding survivorship bias and also allows for variations through the business 
cycle.
7
  Further, applying the model at an industry level avoids the considerable loss of power 
associated with applying the model at a firm level (Dechow et al., 2012, p.290).  In order to 
ensure we have sufficient firms in each industry sector, we start with Datastream Level 3 
industry classifications (19 industries) but in some cases have to combine industries to give 
enough observations in each sector.  Precise details are set out in the Appendix (Table A1).  
Since BE/ME and non-discretionary accruals have an ambiguous meaning for some 
industries, as is standard in the literature, we drop financials and real estate from our analysis.  
Specifically, as we show in the appendix Table A1, we drop Insurance, Financial Services, 
Banks and Real Estate.  We merge Automobiles and Parts into Personal and Household 
Goods, leaving 14 industry groupings in total. 
                                                          
7
 Unfortunately, there is no guidance in Gilbert et al. (2014) on exactly how the Jones (1991) model is 
operationalised in their paper. 
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Using the estimates of 𝛼1 and 𝛼2, for each firm the non-discretionary part of its total current 
accruals, 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 , is calculated as  
 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?1 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) (6) 
 
Where, apart from the variables as defined earlier, ∆ARit is the change in accounts receivable.  
The absolute value of discretionary (abnormal) accrual is then calculated as the absolute 
value of the remaining portion of the total current accruals (AAA)
8
.  
 |𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡| = |(
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) − 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡|  
 
(7) 
Finally, to avoid undue influence from outliers we Winsorise this at the 1% level.  
Gilbert et al. (2014) also uses an alternative measure of opacity which comes from the 
questionnaire based research of Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995). As Gilbert et al. (2014) 
describe the process, the questionnaire “focuses on managerial discretion at the industry level 
between 1985 and 1989 for 31 industries as defined by two-digit SIC codes. We assign the 
managerial discretion measure to all firms in our sample between 1969 and 2010, based on 
the firm’s two-digit SIC code. All firms in the same industry therefore receive the same 
score.”  We do not directly use this measure as there are several issues with applying this 
measure for our purposes.  The first is that the 31 industries surveyed do not constitute a 
comprehensive sample, so that some industries simply have no data.  The second is that these 
31 industries do not map neatly on to the Datastream industry level categories that we can 
observe.  For these reasons, as an alternative, we use DS Level 3 industry dummy variables 
(modified as described above) in our analysis.
9
   
 
 
 
2.5 Size, Leverage and Book to Market measures 
                                                          
8
 In unreported robustness tests, we ran our regressions using the variance of the discretionary accruals over the 
prior three years rather than the lagged value itself.  The results of doing so were qualitatively similar to those 
reported. Gilbert et al. (2014) note that the variance of abnormal accruals makes the firm's production function 
more difficult to discern and therefore investors require more information and time to price the impact of news, 
and this leads to higher opacity. 
9
 In an ideal world, we would, of course, like to examine the case of regulated firms in particular.  However, our 
estimation of the opacity measure requires us to form portfolios of firms based on these Datastream industry 
level categories. 
11 
 
Size: In order to avoid time trends due to increases in market capitalisation, we use the 
market capitalisation of the firm as a percentage of the total capitalisation of the market in 
each year in our analysis.  This variable (Size) is lagged by one year. 
Leverage or gearing:  This we measure as total debt to market value of equity (TD/ME).  Our 
prior would be that indebted firms may be more complex.  For example, Manconi and Massa 
(2009) suggest that firms characterised by higher complexity tend to fund their financial 
deficit with more debt and less equity. So if leverage has such an impact, we might expect a 
positive association between leverage and the difference between low frequency and high 
frequency estimates. 
Book-to-market ratio: We measure Book-to-market ratio as the ratio of Book equity to 
Market Equity (BE/ME). There are several plausible reasons why there could be an 
association between BE/ME and beta. Pope and Stark (1999) provide a model, based upon 
real option theory and costly reversibility, which shows that the CAPM beta will be a 
function of the BE/ME ratio.  In a similar vein, Zhang’s (2005) model of costly reversibility 
combined with a counter-cyclical costs of risk proposes that value firms are riskier than 
growth firms.  However, in both cases the influence on the difference between high and low 
frequency betas is indeterminate.  On the one hand both models posit a dynamic cost of 
capital.
10
  On the other hand, in the spirit of Gilbert et al.  (2014), the implied greater 
complexity of firm structure in such a model may lead to firms with complex real options 
being more “opaque”.  In a CAPM world the corollary would be that beta should be 
associated with BE/ME.  Finally, Campbell, Polk and Voulteenaho (2010) provide a useful 
review of CAPM beta decomposition.  “Value” stocks (i.e. those with high BE/ME) have a 
higher sensitivity to so-called “bad” beta, which captures cash flow shocks.  The implication 
is that BE/ME captures an important risk exposure.  Whilst the common theme here is that 
BE/ME is a proxy for risk, if that risk is particularly difficult to interpret we might expect a 
positive association between BE/ME and the difference between low frequency and high 
frequency estimates.
11
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 We are grateful to Andy Stark for this point. 
11
 One interesting possibility would be to consider R&D/ME as a proxy for complexity.  For example, Al 
Horani, Pope and Stark (2003) show that R&D may be a priced risk factor in the UK.  However, R&D is only 
reported in the UK for accounting periods starting on or after 1
st
 January 1989 (under SSAP13), so allowing for 
accounting lags, this would mean that September 1991 would be the first period for which we could obtain 
estimates of R&D/ME.  In addition, for many firms reported R&D is not present on Datastream. 
12 
 
3. Results 
3.1  Descriptive statistics 
We start with an analysis of betas computed using returns of different frequencies in Table 1. 
In Panel A, we report the betas before dropping extreme observations (defined using the 
highest and lowest percentile differences between monthly and daily and monthly and weekly 
betas) and in Panel B we report the betas after dropping these extreme observations.  In both 
Panels, using conventional estimation periods we note that the mean βEW decreases markedly 
as we move from low frequency (monthly) to higher frequency (weekly and daily) intervals. 
Although the mean βVW does not show this monotonic decrease in Panel A, once we drop the 
extreme percentile observations, the Monthly value weighted (VW) betas are larger than both 
the Weekly and Daily betas and are also closer to unity.  
 
We see similar results when we estimate the betas using a common estimation period.  We 
also conduct tests for significant difference in the mean monthly βVW versus the mean weekly 
βVW  and the mean daily βVW , after dropping extreme observations. For the conventional 
estimation period we find that the difference between monthly and weekly and monthly and 
daily betas are statistically significant and that all the mean βVWs are statistically significantly 
different from unity.  We find similar results for the common estimation period.  In both 
cases, however the monthly mean βVWs are closer in magnitude to unity. However, it is worth 
noting here that because we drop financials and real estate, both of which tend to be high beta 
industries
12
, we cannot assume that the mean βVW  should be unity.   
 
Table 2 and Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the size, liquidity and opacity proxies 
together with beta differences, gearing (TD/ME) and book to market (BE/ME) variables for 
the monthly vs weekly and monthly vs daily data respectively. Panel A reports summary 
statistics whilst Panel B shows the correlations between variables. In Tables 2 and 3, 
consistent with R_to_TR being a measure of illiquidity (i.e. as opposed to liquidity) it is 
negatively correlated with size
13
. Rather more strikingly, beta differences in both the tables 
are inversely correlated with size and positively correlated with illiquidity. Across Tables 2 
and 3, the largest (absolute values) correlations between the difference in beta and other 
variables, is for size (0.29 and 0.22 for the conventional estimation periods and 0.33 and 0.24 
                                                          
12
 See, for example, recent LBS Risk Measurement Service Quarterly publications. 
13
 In unreported figures, we find that consistent with the evidence in Florakis et al. (2011), in all cases the 
correlation between the Amihud and R_to_TR measures of illiquidity are reasonably strong. 
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for the common estimation period). Thus size has strong explanatory power for the difference 
in betas. We conduct further analysis on the effect of size and the results are reported in 
Tables 9 and 10.  
  
3.2 Regression results 
To explain the difference in the beta estimates, we run the following regression for each of 
the monthly-weekly and monthly-daily beta difference specifications: 
 ∆𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑐. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑑. 𝑅_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑒. (𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸)𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝑓. (𝑇𝐷/𝑀𝐸)𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑖. 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 +∈𝑖𝑡 
(8) 
Where in addition to the variables described earlier, ∆𝛽 is the difference between monthly 
and weekly betas or monthly and daily betas, and INDi is an industry dummy (see Appendix 
Table A1 for a detailed description).  When industry dummies are included, we run the 
regressions without the constant, so the coefficients on the each of the dummy variables 
reflects its effect on ∆𝛽𝑖𝑡.  All standard errors, clustered by firm and year, are estimated using 
the two-way cluster robust standard error (or CL-2) approach of Petersen (2009), which Gow 
et al. (2010) show to yield well-specified standard errors in accounting panel data 
simulations.   
 
Table 4 presents the results from the regression of monthly betas minus daily betas on the 
variables of interest. The first two columns report the results for the conventional estimation 
period while the last two columns report the results using the common estimation period.  
“Full 1(3)” refers to the model described by (8) above without industry dummies, but with an 
intercept, whilst “Full 2(4)” refers to the model described by (8) with industry dummies but 
without an intercept. 
 
For the conventional estimation period, opacity is only weakly significant in the absence of 
industry dummies, and loses its significance when industry dummies are introduced.  
However, Size, illiquidity (R_to_TR) and BE/ME are consistently significant in explaining 
beta differences.  This result is consistent with BE/ME capturing information about real 
options that markets need time to interpret   Adjusted R-squareds show significant 
improvement with the inclusion of industry dummies, which demonstrates explanatory power 
of industry effects for the difference in betas. 
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When we run the regressions using a common estimation period, in line with the findings of 
Gilbert et al. (2014) we find that opacity explains the difference in betas.   This is consistent 
with the conjecture that markets need more time to fully interpret new information for more 
“opaque” companies than less opaque ones.  The last column of Table 4 shows that this effect 
is robust to the inclusion of industry dummies.  Overall, as might be expected, and consistent 
with the Table 1 evidence on the difference between mean beta and value-weighted mean 
beta, size effects have an important role to play, in so far as larger companies show less 
difference between monthly and daily betas than smaller ones, and the less liquid a firm’s 
stock is, the greater the difference between monthly and daily betas.  For gearing, there are no 
significant effects, but the BE/ME is associated with beta differences for the conventional 
estimation period and is also weakly significant for the common estimation period when 
industry dummies are included. 
 
Table 5 presents the results from the regression of monthly betas minus weekly betas on the 
variables of interest. Similar to the results in table 4, size and illiquidity are robustly 
associated with the difference in betas across both conventional and common estimation 
periods. Opacity continues to be significant only when we use a common estimation period. 
We also note that significant explanatory power of industry effects as in table 4.   
 
Taken together, the evidence from tables 4 and 5 suggest that there are differences in betas, 
arising from estimation frequency that are related to size, liquidity and industry factors, and 
less robustly to opacity and BE/ME. These results, together with the observation from Table 
1, Panel B that both βVW and βEW estimated using higher frequency returns are underestimated, 
implies that higher frequency betas (weekly and daily betas) may not be as reliable indicators 
of the true beta as lower frequency betas (monthly). That we are able to explain the 
differences between high and low frequency betas by factors that can be viewed as proxies 
for risk suggests that the high frequency beta estimates omit important risk characteristics. 
 
In Table 6, we report industry coefficients for the Full 2 and Full 4 models, presented in 
tables 4 and 5. We note that, except for utilities, all the industries have a significant positive 
coefficient. The coefficient on utilities is positive though not statistically significant.  It is 
perhaps worth pausing to consider what this means, and, more importantly, what it does not 
mean.  It does not mean that for utilities the difference between high frequency and low 
frequency betas is unimportant.  Rather, it means that beyond those variables that can explain 
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the difference (broadly, size, illiquidity, opacity and BE/ME), simple industry membership 
has nothing further to add.  In all other cases, it does.  This suggests that some industries are 
particularly difficult to understand in terms of the impact of changes in systematic risk 
factors, and that there are other factors at work in addition to our chosen measures.  
Alternatively, one could interpret this result as suggesting that our chosen opacity measure is 
a poor measure of true opacity in most industries. 
 
In Tables 7 and 8 we carry out further analysis by running regressions similar to (8), but we 
now run regressions on subsamples partitioned on the basis of size and illiquidity. In Table 7, 
which presents the monthly versus daily analysis, we find that even for the largest and most 
liquid of companies, size and illiquidity measures are significantly associated with the 
difference in betas. Not surprisingly the significance of the illiquidity factor diminishes when 
we consider the most liquid companies, but the effect is still significant at 10%. Industry 
effects continue to be important.  Opacity is significant only when we use common 
estimation periods. BE/ME is not robustly associated with the difference in betas in these 
partitioned samples. In Table 8 (monthly versus weekly), we find broadly similar results, with 
size and illiquidity continuing to be significantly associated with the difference in betas. 
However, BE/ME is now consistently associated with beta differences in the conventional 
estimation period results.  The results from tables 7 and 8, together with the evidence from 
Table 1. Panel B, suggests that high frequency beta estimates may omit important risk 
characteristics even in the case of larger and more liquid firms. 
 
In Tables 9 and 10, we carry out further tests on the role of size. From the regressions, it is 
evident that there is an inverse relationship between size and the difference in betas. In Tables  
9 and 10, we form size quintiles and examine the summary statistics of the variables of 
interest across the size groups.  For the largest firms, it is noteworthy that the average relative 
size is at least five times greater than the average relative size of the next lowest size group. 
We also note that not surprisingly the illiquidity falls as we move from the smallest to the 
largest group.  Importantly, we find that consistent with the evidence from the regressions, 
the average difference in betas decreases as we move from the smallest to the largest 
portfolio of firms. The difference in beta is significantly different from zero at 1% level for 
all but the largest portfolio. This is true for both the difference in monthly and weekly betas 
and monthly and daily betas and across both conventional and common estimation periods. 
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For the largest portfolio, the difference is still positive (i.e. the low frequency beta is greater 
than the high frequency beta) but statistically insignificant.  
 
The evidence so far suggested that low frequency betas estimates may be underestimated. 
Our additional analysis in Tables 7-10 provides additional support for this finding, although 
Tables 9 and 10 suggest that the relationship is weak for the largest group of companies.  
 
3.4 GRS Test Results 
Our final set of tests involves standard GRS tests of the CAPM
14
.  The GRS F-statistic tests 
whether the time-series intercepts (pricing errors) are all zero when excess returns on assets 
under consideration are regressed against the risk factors of any particular asset pricing 
model. With N number of test assets, the test is whether the N intercepts are jointly 
indistinguishable from zero. In testing the CAPM, the GRS test proceeds by running OLS 
time series regressions of the form  
 Rit − Rft =αi +βi (Rmt-Rft) + εit  (9) 
for each test asset portfolio. Rit is the return on the test portfolio, Rft is the risk-free rate, Rmt is 
the return on the market portfolio.  The form of the test is  
 
𝑇 [1 + (
𝐸𝑇(𝑓)
?̂?(𝑓)
)
2
]
−1
∝̂′ ?̂?−1 ∝̂  ~ 𝜒𝑁
2 (10) 
Where 𝐸𝑇(𝑓) denotes the sample mean of the factor, ?̂?(𝑓) denotes the sample variance and ∝̂ 
is a vector of estimated intercepts. ?̂? is the residual covariance matrix and T is the number of 
time periods. The GRS test statistic is then 
 𝑇 − 𝑁 − 1
𝑁
[1 + (
𝐸𝑇(𝑓)
?̂?(𝑓)
)
2
]
−1
∝̂′ ?̂?−1 ∝̂  ~ 𝐹𝑁,𝑇−𝑁−1 (11) 
If there is a “missing risk” component in high frequency betas, this should show up in up to 
three ways.  First, GRS tests of the CAPM should be less anomalous when we use low 
frequency betas rather than high frequency betas.  Second, the explanatory power of the 
regressions (as measured by the mean R-squared of the portfolio regression tests) should be 
higher for low frequency betas compared to high frequency betas. Third, individual portfolio 
alphas should be less significant for low frequency estimates than for high frequency ones. 
                                                          
14
 GRS test (a time series regression test) is a standard test of the joint significance of the alphas in the asset 
pricing literature, although widely used, we note that increasing the number of test assets (N), relative to the 
number of time series (T) will have an adverse effect on the power of the test. However, we do not see this as a 
problem for the number of test assets and length of the time series we consider.   
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In conducting these tests, we report two sets of results.  The first uses the “standard” Fama-
French value-weighted portfolios formed using the intersection of size (market capitalisation) 
and book-to-market.  These portfolios are formed from the top 30% of firms by market 
capitalisation each year.  Every year (in September) we take this sample of top 30% of the 
firms and we independently sort these into three book to market groups by using the 30
th
 and 
70
th
 percentile of the BE/ME) (or book to market) ratio and quintiles by size. The intersection 
results in fifteen size and book-to-market portfolios. The second set of tests, following the 
suggestion of Lewellen et al. (2010, p.182), uses value-weighted portfolios formed on the 
basis of volatility (the standard deviation of returns). Similar to the formation of the size and 
book-to-market portfolios, using the sample of the top 30% of firms by market capitalisation, 
every year we sort firms into twelve size groups based on the standard deviation of returns 
over the previous 12 months.   
The results based on the size and book-to-market sorts (Table 11) suggest that the CAPM in 
does surprisingly well in terms of the GRS tests.
15
  When tested against the size and book to 
market portfolios (Table 11) we cannot reject the hypothesis that all the intercepts are jointly 
insignificant for any of the beta frequency estimates.  None of the alphas is significant. 
Nonetheless, we observe that the mean R-squared falls monotonically as we move from 
monthly through to daily betas.  Allowing for differences in return periods, there is also a 
tendency for intercepts to be closer to zero when low frequency betas are used.
16
 The 
annualised intercepts
17
 show a tendency to increase as we move from monthly to daily data.  
However, a very different picture emerges when test portfolios are formed on the basis of the 
standard deviation (Table 12).  Whilst we cannot reject the joint significance of the intercepts 
for any of the frequency estimates, we see evidence that some individual portfolios have 
significant alphas, and that this propensity increases with the frequency of estimation. When 
betas are estimated monthly, one intercept (the low volatility portfolio) has an alpha that is 
significantly positive at the 5% level, with a further one being significant at the 10% level.  
Once we move to weekly and daily frequencies, we observe that two alphas are significant at 
                                                          
15
 This is likely to be attributable to the restriction of the model to larger firms - see Gregory, Tharyan and 
Christidis (2013), and also Fletcher (2010) for a rather more pessimistic analysis of UK asset pricing.  
Additionally, in unreported tests using Fama-MacBeth regressions we find that the market risk factor is never 
priced. 
16
 Note that the mean alphas reported in the table are monthly, weekly and daily returns respectively so cannot 
be compared without multiplication.  Hence our reporting of annualised returns.  
17
 Annualised intercepts are (1+r)
n
 -1 , where r is the unrounded intercept and n is the number of compounding 
periods per annum (i.e. 12 for monthly, 52 for weekly and 250 for daily). 
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the 5% level, with a further one being significant at the 10% level.  Further, these portfolios 
are at the extremes, with the low volatility portfolios exhibiting significant positive alphas but 
the high volatility portfolios exhibiting significant negative alphas.  When tests are carried 
out on this basis, the annualised intercept mean return is actually lowest on a monthly basis 
(0.11% p.a.), but highest on a daily basis (1.20%).  Taken as a whole, these results, whilst not 
compelling, hint that the CAPM may be better specified as a risk pricing model when betas 
are calculated on a low frequency basis. 
 
4 Conclusion 
Whatever views one might have on the suitability of the CAPM, the model is used 
extensively by practitioners and regulatory authorities around the world.  How to estimate 
beta in applications that use the CAPM is therefore an important issue.  As we have noted, 
there has been a tendency for UK regulatory bodies to regard high frequency beta estimates 
as more useful, and indeed in some cases judgements have been made that daily betas are 
superior to monthly betas. The research question that this paper has addressed is whether 
there is any validity in the use of high frequency betas.  We already know, from Gilbert et al. 
(2014), that high frequency betas are problematic in the US, and so the focus in this paper has 
been on assessing whether beta estimates are frequency dependent in the UK, and if so 
whether these differences can be explained by variables that may be plausibly construed as 
risk factors.  
 
We have shown that high frequency betas generally have lower mean values than low 
frequency (monthly) betas.  We then investigated if these differences can be explained.  We 
have shown that these differences can be explained by size, illiquidity and industry effects 
and, to some degree, by market to book effects and opacity. These results all apply in our full 
sample, which by design eliminate the smallest firms in order to avoid known thin trading 
problems. This decision was also motivated by us noting that typically only larger firms are 
subject to regulation or market investigations.  Nonetheless, in robustness tests we showed 
that most of these effects remain even when we run tests on sub-samples of the largest stocks 
and most liquid stocks.  The evidence that high frequency betas may be underestimated 
together with the evidence that we are able to explain the difference using variables that 
might proxy for risk suggest that in general high frequency beta estimates do not fully reflect 
the likely risk characteristics of stocks.  Therefore their use in the CAPM, in preference to a 
low frequency beta estimates, is likely to under-estimate the cost of equity capital, on 
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average.  We also showed that there is some corroborating, albeit weak, evidence that 
intercepts from CAPM portfolio regression tests are somewhat more likely to be significant 
when high frequency betas are employed, and that the mean R-squareds from these portfolio 
tests tend to be inversely related to beta frequency.  These results are consistent with low 
frequency betas giving better estimates of the true beta. 
Our findings have potential policy implications for regulators and other users of the CAPM.  
In general, low frequency betas should be preferred to high frequency betas.  If users still 
wish to use high frequency betas in their analysis, then it is important to check whether those 
high frequency beta estimates are being biased downwards by size, illiquidity and industry 
effects and to a lesser extent opacity and BE/ME. That said, clearly these issues, whilst 
important, are of even greater significance when looking at smaller and medium sized firms. 
However, we note an important caveat with respect to our study. Our estimates of beta could 
potentially be affected by reference day risk (Acker and Duck, 2007). Acker and Duck (2007) 
use Datastream return indices and find that reference day risk affects the estimation of betas.  
In using the monthly LSPD database for our monthly beta estimates we are confined to using 
the LSPD’s own reference days, which are trading month ends. Furthermore, by design our 
study uses a common reference day each year (30
th
 September) to allow for the fact that 
annual report and accounts information needs to become embedded in stock prices.  This date 
is common to each of the estimates of monthly, weekly and daily data. 
Given that our primary focus is on explaining the differences in betas with firm 
characteristics that might plausibly proxy for risk, our assumption is effectively that any 
reference day risk will have a similar impact on each of these estimates and so will not affect 
inferences about the differences between betas using different frequencies.  This assumption 
would seem to be reasonable in the case of the common estimation period analysis, though is 
clearly more questionable when we look at the conventional estimation period results, where 
the starting reference day (though clearly not the terminating reference day) differs according 
to beta frequency.  Furthermore, noting the Acker and Duck (2007) findings with relation to 
portfolio betas, we note that our size portfolio results in Tables 9 and 10 still show marked 
differences in betas estimated from different frequencies.  Nonetheless, an interesting 
question for future research is whether the same effects exist if LSPD daily returns data are 
used in reference day comparisons. It is also worth noting that the large difference in the size 
of the effect for telecoms versus utilities could be further explored in future research. 
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In conclusion, our findings suggest that on average, a cost of equity estimated from a CAPM  
using daily or weekly betas could mis-estimate the true cost of equity by not properly 
considering the impact of known risk factors.  Besides the importance of this for users of the 
CAPM in general, this result has particularly important policy implications for all utility 
regulators and competition authorities.  
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Table 1: Summary Beta statistics 
Panel A UK Betas Before Dropping Extremes 
Return Frequency Obs βEW SD Min Max βVW 
Conventional Estimation Period 
Monthly 4417 1.038*** 0.490 -0.457 4.105 0.894*** 
Weekly 4417 0.853*** 0.456 -0.675 4.274 0.943*** 
Daily 4417 0.729*** 0.442 -0.176 3.992 0.948*** 
Monthly-Weekly 
4417 0.185*** 0.423 -1.975 2.247 -0.049*** 
Monthly-Daily 4417 0.309*** 0.506 -1.985 3.068 -0.054*** 
Common Estimation Period 
Monthly 4157 1.035*** 0.500 -0.457 4.105 0.888*** 
Weekly 4157 0.841*** 0.393 -0.162 2.681 0.931*** 
Daily 4157 0.702*** 0.372 0.019 2.416 0.946*** 
Monthly-Weekly 4157 0.194*** 0.349 -1.475 2.426 -0.043*** 
Monthly-Daily 4157 0.333*** 0.436 -1.239 2.867 -0.058*** 
Panel B UK Betas After Dropping Extremes 
Return Frequency Obs βEW SD Min Max βVW 
Conventional Estimation Period 
Monthly 3975 1.011*** 0.435 -0.457 3.464 0.912*** 
Weekly 3975 0.828*** 0.417 -0.329 2.831 0.880*** 
Monthly-Weekly 3975 0.183*** 0.309 -0.464 0.884 0.032*** 
Monthly 3975 1.010*** 0.428 -0.275 3.464 0.923*** 
Daily 3975 0.707*** 0.409 -0.176 2.657 0.883*** 
Monthly-Daily 3975 0.304*** 0.392 -0.487 1.128 0.040*** 
Common Estimation Period 
Monthly 3741 1.008*** 0.425 -0.182 2.823 0.915*** 
Weekly 3741 0.823*** 0.376 -0.162 2.551 0.875*** 
Monthly-Weekly 3741 0.186*** 0.254 -0.319 0.778 0.040*** 
Monthly 3741 1.010*** 0.414 -0.162 2.776 0.941*** 
Daily 3741 0.688*** 0.365 0.019 2.416 0.887*** 
Monthly-Daily 3741 0.322*** 0.332 -0.313 1.064 0.054*** 
 
This table shows the summary statistics of the betas estimated by using monthly, weekly and 
daily returns. Panel A is based on observations where the extreme percentiles of Monthly β-
Daily β or Monthly β-Weekly β have not been dropped. Panel B is based on observations 
where the extreme percentiles of Monthly β- Daily β or Monthly β-Weekly β have been 
dropped.  In each Panel, the first six rows are based on different estimation periods, and the 
second six rows are based on a common estimation period of five years. Obs. is the number 
of firm-year observations. Monthly-Weekly is the difference in the Monthly and Weekly 
betas, and Monthly-Daily is the difference in Monthly and Daily betas. βEW is the equal 
weighted beta and βVW is the value weighted beta. ***, ** and * denotes the significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics, Monthly vs Daily Sample 
Conventional Estimation Period 
Panel A: Means, standard deviations and medians 
Variable Obs Mean SD Median 
ΔBeta 3975 0.304*** 0.392 0.298 
Size 3975 0.003*** 0.006 0.001 
AAA 3975 0.040*** 0.047 0.026 
R_to_TR 3975 1.413*** 2.583 0.713 
TD/ME 3975 0.334*** 0.482 0.228 
BE/ME 3975 0.480*** 0.413 0.391 
Panel B: Correlations:  
Variable ΔBeta Size AAA R_to_TR TD/ME BE/ME 
ΔBeta 1.00      
Size -0.29*** 1.00     
AAA 0.06*** -0.08*** 1.00    
R_to_TR 0.20*** -0.11*** 0.06*** 1.00   
TD/ME 0.02 -0.03 -0.07*** 0.07*** 1.00  
BE/ME 0.07*** -0.02 -0.11*** 0.02 0.41*** 1.00 
Common Estimation Period 
Panel C: Means, standard deviations and medians 
Variable Obs Mean SD Median 
ΔBeta 3741 0.322*** 0.332 0.319 
Size 3741 0.002*** 0.006 0.001 
AAA 3741 0.040*** 0.046 0.026 
R_to_TR 3741 1.400*** 2.459 0.716 
TD/ME 3741 0.330*** 0.487 0.221 
BE/ME 3741 0.484*** 0.442 0.387 
Panel D: Correlations:  
Variable ΔBeta Size AAA R_to_TR TD/ME BE/ME 
ΔBeta 1.00      
Size -0.33*** 1.00     
AAA 0.10*** -0.09*** 1.00    
R_to_TR 0.19*** -0.11*** 0.06*** 1.00   
TD/ME 0.00 -0.02 -0.07*** 0.08*** 1.00  
BE/ME 0.05*** -0.04** -0.08*** 0.03* 0.45*** 1.00 
This table shows the summary statistics for the measures of opacity, Size and illiquidity, plus 
control variables. Where ΔBeta is the difference between monthly and daily betas, AAA is the 
Winsorised absolute value of abnormal accruals from the estimation of Modified Jones 
(1991) model, Size is the firm’s market capitalisation as a percentage of total market 
capitalisation, R_to_TR, is the Winsorised illiquidity ratio from Florackis et al. (2011), 
TD/ME is the gearing ratio calculated as total debt/market value of equity, and BE/ME is the 
book value of equity to the market value of equity. For a detailed explanation of the measures 
and precise descriptions of the year end dates used, see text. Panels A & B are based on 
different (conventional) estimation periods, Panels C & D are based on common estimation 
periods. ***, ** and * denotes the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics, Monthly vs Weekly Sample 
Conventional Estimation Period 
Panel A: Means, standard deviations and medians 
Variable Obs Mean SD Median 
ΔBeta 3975 0.183*** 0.309 0.171 
Size 3975 0.003*** 0.006 0.001 
AAA 3975 0.040*** 0.047 0.026 
R_to_TR 3975 1.400*** 2.584 0.700 
TD/ME 3975 0.336*** 0.489 0.228 
BE/ME 3975 0.488*** 0.430 0.396 
Panel B: Correlations: 
Variable ΔBeta Size AAA R_to_TR TD/ME BE/ME 
ΔBeta 1.00      
Size -0.22*** 1.00     
AAA 0.05*** -0.09*** 1.00    
R_to_TR 0.15*** -0.11*** 0.07*** 1.00   
TD/ME 0.01 -0.03* -0.08*** 0.06*** 1.00  
BE/ME 0.05*** -0.02 -0.10*** 0.01 0.45*** 1.00 
Common Estimation Period 
Panel C: Means, standard deviations and medians 
Variable Obs Mean SD Median 
ΔBeta 3741 0.186*** 0.254 0.171 
Size 3741 0.002*** 0.006 0.001 
AAA 3741 0.040*** 0.046 0.026 
R_to_TR 3741 1.404*** 2.477 0.720 
TD/ME 3741 0.327*** 0.474 0.221 
BE/ME 3741 0.489*** 0.435 0.391 
Panel D: Correlations:  
Variable ΔBeta Size AAA R_to_TR TD/ME BE/ME 
ΔBeta 1.00      
Size -0.24*** 1.00     
AAA 0.07*** -0.09*** 1.00    
R_to_TR 0.16*** -0.11*** 0.06*** 1.00   
TD/ME 0.01 -0.02 -0.07*** 0.08*** 1.00  
BE/ME 0.05*** -0.04** -0.08*** 0.03 0.46*** 1.00 
This table shows the summary statistics for the measures of opacity, size and illiquidity, plus 
control variables. Where ΔBeta is the difference between monthly and weekly betas, AAA is 
the Winsorised absolute value of abnormal accruals from the estimation of Modified Jones 
(1991) model, Size is the firm’s market capitalisation as a percentage of total market 
capitalisation, R_to_TR, is the Winsorised illiquidity ratio from Florackis et al. (2011), 
TD/ME is the gearing ratio calculated as total debt/market value of equity, and BE/ME is the 
book value of equity to the market value of equity. For a detailed explanation of the measures 
and precise descriptions of the year end dates used, see text. Panels A & B are based on 
different (conventional) estimation periods, Panels C & D are based on common estimation 
periods. ***, ** and * denotes the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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Table 4: Explaining the difference in Monthly vs Daily betas 
Estimation period Conventional Estimation Period Common Estimation Period 
Model Full1 Full2 Full3 Full4 
AAA 
0.293* 0.270 0.439*** 0.377*** 
(0.157) (0.172) (0.138) (0.140) 
Size 
-17.000*** -15.365*** -18.427*** -16.787*** 
(5.304) (5.077) (6.389) (5.387) 
R_to_TR 
0.025*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
TD/ME 
-0.023 -0.014 -0.030 -0.014 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) 
BE/ME 
0.077** 0.098*** 0.045 0.059* 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) 
intercept 
0.270***  0.303***  
(0.039)  (0.031)  
N 3975 3975 3741 3741 
R
2
 0.115 0.481 0.140 0.594 
Industry Dummies? N Y N Y 
 
The full version of the model is: 
∆𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑐. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑑. 𝑅_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑒. 𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑒. 𝑇𝐷/𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑖. 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑡 
Full 1 includes all control variables but no industry dummies, whilst Full 2 includes all 
control variables plus industry dummies (no-intercept), both models using conventional 
estimation periods (5-years for monthly beta, 1-year for daily beta). Full 3 includes all control 
variables but no industry dummies, whilst Full 4 includes all control variables plus industry 
dummies (no-intercept), both models using common estimation periods (5-years for monthly 
beta, 5-years for daily beta).   β is Mβ-Dβ, the difference between monthly and daily betas. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. AAA is the Winsorised absolute value of 
abnormal accruals from the estimation of Modified Jones (1991) model, Size is the firm’s 
market capitalisation as a percentage of total market capitalisation, R_to_TR, is the 
Winsorised illiquidity ratio from Florackis et al. (2011), TD/ME is the gearing ratio 
calculated as total debt/market value of equity, and BE/ME is the book value of equity to the 
market value of equity. For a detailed explanation of the measures and precise descriptions of 
the year end dates  used, see text. Industry dummies are included where indicated. For a 
detailed explanation of the measures and industry classification see text.  R
2
  is the adjusted 
R-Squared. For each independent variable, we show the coefficient in the first row and 
standard errors in the second row. ***, ** and * denotes the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.  
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 Table 5: Explaining the difference in Monthly vs Weekly betas 
Estimation period Conventional Estimation Period Common Estimation Period 
Model Full1 Full2 Full3 Full4 
AAA 
0.147 
(0.109) 
0.148 
(0.121) 
0.271** 
(0.108) 
0.254** 
(0.107) 
Size 
-10.378*** 
(3.064) 
-9.317*** 
(3.118) 
-9.290*** 
(3.194) 
-8.507*** 
(2.801) 
R_to_TR 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
TD/ME 
-0.020 
(0.017) 
-0.018 
(0.018) 
-0.015 
(0.015) 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
BE/ME 
0.043** 
(0.022) 
0.056*** 
(0.022) 
0.033 
(0.021) 
0.045** 
(0.021) 
intercept 
0.167*** 
(0.026) 
 0.165*** 
(0.020) 
 
N 3975 3975 3741 3741 
R
2
 0.068 0.336 0.080 0.435 
Industry Dummies? N Y N Y 
 
The full version of the model is: 
∆𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑐. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑑. 𝑅_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑒. 𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑒. 𝑇𝐷/𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑖. 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑡 
Full 1 includes all control variables but no industry dummies, whilst Full 2 includes all 
control variables plus industry dummies (no-intercept), both models using conventional 
estimation periods (5-years for monthly beta, 2-years for weekly beta). Full 3 includes all 
control variables but no industry dummies, whilst Full 4 includes all control variables plus 
industry dummies (no-intercept), both models using common estimation periods (5-years for 
monthly beta, 5-years for weekly beta).  β is Mβ-Wβ, the difference between monthly and 
weekly betas. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. AAA is the Winsorised absolute 
value of abnormal accruals from the estimation of Modified Jones (1991) model, Size is the 
firm’s market capitalisation as a percentage of total market capitalisation,  R_to_TR, is the 
Winsorised illiquidity ratio from Florackis et al. (2011), TD/ME is the gearing ratio 
calculated as total debt/market value of equity, and BE/ME is the book value of equity to the 
market value of equity. For a detailed explanation of the measures and precise descriptions of 
the year end dates used, see text. Industry dummies are included where indicated. For a 
detailed explanation of the measures and industry classification see text.  R
2
  is the adjusted 
R-Squared. For each independent variable, we show the coefficient in the first row and 
standard errors in the second row. ***, ** and * denotes the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.  
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Table 6: Industry Dummies for models Full 2 and Full 4. 
 
Estimation 
Period 
Conventional 
Estimation  
Period 
Common 
Estimation 
Period 
Conventional 
Estimation  
Period 
Common 
Estimation 
Period 
Industry 
Monthly - Daily beta Monthly – Weekly beta 
Full 2  Full 4  Full 2  Full 4  
BRESR 
0.2259*** 
(0.066) 
0.2750*** 
(0.052) 
0.1235** 
(0.053) 
0.1416*** 
(0.037) 
CHMCL 
0.3392*** 
(0.055) 
0.3390*** 
(0.056) 
0.1970*** 
(0.038) 
0.1649*** 
(0.038) 
CNSTM 
0.3276*** 
(0.063) 
0.3197*** 
(0.041) 
0.1710*** 
(0.043) 
0.1487*** 
(0.031) 
FDBEV 
0.0927* 
(0.055) 
0.1291*** 
(0.047) 
0.0602* 
(0.033) 
0.0564** 
(0.029) 
HLTHC 
0.2180*** 
(0.067) 
0.2465*** 
(0.068) 
0.1137** 
(0.045) 
0.1042** 
(0.041) 
INDGS 
0.3424*** 
(0.041) 
0.3840*** 
(0.032) 
0.2127*** 
(0.028) 
0.2167*** 
(0.023) 
MEDIA 
0.3477*** 
(0.053) 
0.3538*** 
(0.060) 
0.2656*** 
(0.040) 
0.2444*** 
(0.051) 
OILGS 
0.2097*** 
(0.075) 
0.3329*** 
(0.066) 
0.1122* 
(0.059) 
0.1704*** 
(0.047) 
PERHH 
0.2491*** 
(0.067) 
0.3134*** 
(0.053) 
0.1512*** 
(0.044) 
0.1582*** 
(0.034) 
RTAIL 
0.1482*** 
(0.043) 
0.1840*** 
(0.039) 
0.1054*** 
(0.031) 
0.0959*** 
(0.028) 
TECNO 
0.2687*** 
(0.050) 
0.3073*** 
(0.045) 
0.1300*** 
(0.027) 
0.1691*** 
(0.024) 
TELCM 
0.6199*** 
(0.143) 
0.3962*** 
(0.116) 
0.4767*** 
(0.148) 
0.4956*** 
(0.088) 
TRLES 
0.2149*** 
(0.055) 
0.2549*** 
(0.045) 
0.1694*** 
(0.046) 
0.1598*** 
(0.036) 
UTILS 
0.0475 
(0.081) 
0.0528 
(0.061) 
0.0214 
(0.054) 
0.0186 
(0.043) 
 
This table shows the basic Datastream Level 3 industry classifications. Dummies are from 
models Full 2 and Full 4 in tables 4 and 5.  Full 2 is based on conventional estimation 
periods, while Full 4 is based on common estimation periods.  Column 1 and 2 are monthly 
verses daily, while Column 3 and 4 are monthly verses weekly. 
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Table 7: Explaining the difference in Betas –Monthly vs Daily betas, restricted sample 
Model 
Conventional Estimation Period Common Estimation Period 
Large Large Liquid Liquid Large Large Liquid Liquid 
Restrict 1 Restrict 2 Restrict 3 Restrict 4 Restrict 1 Restrict 2 Restrict 3 Restrict 4 
AAA 
0.142 
(0.229) 
0.127 
(0.241) 
0.324 
(0.247) 
0.202 
(0.244) 
0.324 
(0.226) 
0.269 
(0.203) 
0.554** 
(0.231) 
0.402** 
(0.201) 
Size 
-11.688*** 
(3.915) 
-11.400*** 
(3.865) 
-15.326*** 
(4.478) 
-16.014*** 
(5.070) 
-12.294*** 
(4.575) 
-10.866*** 
(3.980) 
-17.873*** 
(5.785) 
-16.427*** 
(5.293) 
R_to_TR 
0.025*** 
(0.006) 
0.021*** 
(0.005) 
0.314*** 
(0.075) 
0.300*** 
(0.073) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.158** 
(0.069) 
0.127* 
(0.065) 
TD/ME 
0.006 
(0.024) 
0.006 
(0.022) 
0.037 
(0.035) 
0.050 
(0.038) 
0.002 
(0.022) 
0.007 
(0.020) 
0.020 
(0.033) 
0.037 
(0.033) 
BE/ME 
0.058 
(0.041) 
0.084** 
(0.040) 
0.053 
(0.034) 
0.056* 
(0.033) 
0.028 
(0.044) 
0.049 
(0.047) 
0.039 
(0.038) 
0.042 
(0.038) 
intercept 
0.173*** 
(0.042) 
 0.061 
(0.048) 
 0.192*** 
(0.036) 
 0.146*** 
(0.048) 
 
N 1995 1995 1995 1995 1876 1876 1876 1876 
R
2
 0.094 0.297 0.126 0.364 0.112 0.401 0.131 0.442 
Industry 
Dummies? 
N Y N Y N Y N Y 
The full version of the model is: ∆𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑐. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑑. 𝑅_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑒. 𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑒. 𝑇𝐷/𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑖. 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑡 
The first group of models(restrict 1&2) restricts the sample to cases where Size is above the median.  Restrict 1 includes all control variables but no 
industry dummies, whilst Restrict 2 includes all control variables plus industry dummies (no-intercept). The second group of models (restrict 3&4)  
restricts the sample to cases where illiquidity measure is below the median (that is, the most liquid companies).  Restrict 3 includes all control variables 
but no industry dummies, whilst Restrict 4 includes all control variables plus industry dummies (no-intercept).   β is Mβ-Dβ, the difference between 
monthly and daily betas. First four columns are based on coventional estimation periods; the second four then repeat these for a common estimation 
period. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. AAA is the Winsorised absolute value of abnormal accruals from the estimation of Modified 
Jones (1991) model, Size is the firm’s market capitalisation as a percentage of total market capitalisation, R_to_TR, is the Winsorised illiquidity ratio 
from Florackis et al. (2011), TD/ME is the gearing ratio calculated as total debt/market value of equity, and BE/ME is the book value of equity to the 
market value of equity.   For a detailed explanation of the measures and precise descriptions of the year end dates used, see text. Industry dummies are 
included where indicated. R
2
  is the adjusted R-Squared. For each independent variable, we show the coefficient in the first row and standard errors in 
the second row. ***, ** and * denotes the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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Table 8: Explaining the difference in Betas –Monthly vs Weekly betas, restricted sample 
Model 
Conventional Estimation Period Common Estimation Period 
Restrict 1 Restrict 2 Restrict 3 Restrict 4 Restrict 1 Restrict 2 Restrict 3 Restrict 4 
AAA 
0.136 
(0.153) 
0.136 
(0.149) 
0.135 
(0.172) 
0.097 
(0.178) 
0.328* 
(0.171) 
0.295* 
(0.157) 
0.336* 
(0.176) 
0.233 
(0.162) 
Size 
-6.949*** 
(2.318) 
-6.656*** 
(2.486) 
-8.645*** 
(2.454) 
-9.173*** 
(2.953) 
-5.605*** 
(2.088) 
-5.070** 
(2.004) 
-7.302*** 
(2.663) 
-7.072*** 
(2.734) 
R_to_TR 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.138* 
(0.075) 
0.133* 
(0.076) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.114* 
(0.058) 
0.105* 
(0.055) 
TD/ME 
0.009 
(0.035) 
0.023 
(0.035) 
0.005 
(0.031) 
0.012 
(0.034) 
0.005 
(0.029) 
0.014 
(0.028) 
0.017 
(0.027) 
0.024 
(0.027) 
BE/ME 
0.052* 
(0.029) 
0.068** 
(0.033) 
0.048** 
(0.020) 
0.052** 
(0.021) 
0.053* 
(0.030) 
0.060* 
(0.032) 
0.039 
(0.024) 
0.039 
(0.025) 
intercept 
0.091*** 
(0.030) 
 0.060 
(0.041) 
 0.077*** 
(0.024) 
 0.052 
(0.034) 
 
N 1995 1995 1994 1994 1875 1875 1875 1875 
R
2
 0.053 0.180 0.052 0.219 0.061 0.249 0.066 0.287 
Industry Dummies? N Y N Y N Y N Y 
The full version of the model is: ∆𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑐. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑑. 𝑅_𝑡𝑜_𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑒. 𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑒. 𝑇𝐷/𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑖. 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑡 
The first group of models (restrict 1&2) restricts the sample to cases where Size is above the median.  Restrict 1 includes all control variables but no 
industry dummies, whilst Restrict 2 includes all control variables plus industry dummies (no-intercept). The second group of models (restrict 3&4)  
restricts the sample to cases where liquidity measure is below the median (that is, the most liquid companies).  Restrict 3 includes all control variables 
but no industry dummies, whilst Restrict 4 includes all control variables plus industry dummies (no-intercept). First four columns are based on 
conventional estimation periods; the second four then repeat these for a common estimation period.   β is Mβ-Wβ, the difference between monthly 
and weekly betas. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. AAA is the Winsorised absolute value of abnormal accruals from the estimation of 
Modified Jones (1991) model, Size is the firm’s market capitalisation as a percentage of total market capitalisation,  R_to_TR, is the Winsorised 
illiquidity ratio from Florackis et al. (2011), TD/ME is the gearing ratio calculated as total debt/market value of equity, and BE/ME is the book value 
of equity to the market value of equity.   For a detailed explanation of the measures and precise descriptions of the year end dates used, see text. 
Industry dummies are included where indicated. R
2
 is the adjusted R-Squared. For each independent variable, we show the coefficient in the first row 
and standard errors in the second row. ***, ** and * denotes the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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 Table 9: Summary statistics of size portfolio constituents, Monthly-Daily 
This table reports the summary statistics for the constituents of five equal-weighted portfolios sorted by the market capitalisation. The portfolios are 
formed annually. Monthly (daily) betas are estimated at the end of every calendar year using monthly (daily) returns. AAA is the Winsorised absolute 
value of abnormal accruals from the estimation of Modified Jones (1991) model, Size is the firm’s market capitalisation as a percentage of total market 
capitalisation, R_to_TR, is the Winsorised illiquidity ratio from Florackis et al. (2011), TD/ME is the gearing ratio calculated as total debt/market value 
of equity, and BE/ME is the book value of equity to the market value of equity. For a detailed explanation of the measures and precise descriptions of 
the year end dates used, see text. The sample period is 1989-2013. Port 1 (S) is the smallest size, and Port 5 (L) is the largest size portfolio. Statistical 
significance for beta difference,  ***, ** and * denotes the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Conventional Estimation Period Panel A: Portfolios formed on  Size  
Variable Port 1 (S) Port 2 Port 3 Port 4 Port 5 (L) 
Number of Firms 806 797 789 796 787 
Monthly Beta 0.965*** 1.037*** 1.089*** 1.046*** 0.915*** 
Daily Beta 0.520*** 0.603*** 0.712*** 0.808*** 0.895*** 
ΔBeta 0.445*** 0.434*** 0.377*** 0.238*** 0.019 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.010*** 
AAA 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.030*** 
R_to_TR 2.628*** 1.705*** 1.187*** 0.952*** 0.569*** 
TD/ME 0.322*** 0.287*** 0.362*** 0.394*** 0.305*** 
BE/ME 0.509*** 0.494*** 0.472*** 0.496*** 0.430*** 
Common Estimation Period Panel B: Portfolios formed on  Size 
Variable Port 1 (S) Port 2 Port 3 Port 4 Port 5 (L) 
Number of Firms 758 748 748 748 739 
Monthly Beta 0.964*** 1.031*** 1.064*** 1.056*** 0.938*** 
Daily Beta 0.488*** 0.572*** 0.659*** 0.809*** 0.919*** 
ΔBeta 0.476*** 0.458*** 0.404*** 0.247*** 0.019* 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 
AAA 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 
R_to_TR 2.471*** 1.785*** 1.251*** 0.884*** 0.585*** 
TD/ME 0.320*** 0.275*** 0.358*** 0.388*** 0.310*** 
BE/ME 0.531*** 0.487*** 0.474*** 0.501*** 0.429*** 
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Table 10: Summary statistics of size portfolio constituents, Monthly-Weekly  
 
This table reports summary statistics for the constituents of five equal-weighted portfolios sorted by the market capitalisation. The portfolios are 
formed annually based on each stock’s size. Monthly (weekly) betas are estimated at the end of every calendar year using monthly (weekly). AAA is 
the Winsorised absolute value of abnormal accruals from the estimation of Modified Jones (1991) model, Size is the firm’s market capitalisation as a 
percentage of total market capitalisation, R_to_TR, is the Winsorised illiquidity ratio from Florackis et al. (2011), TD/ME is the gearing ratio 
calculated as total debt/market value of equity, and BE/ME is the book value of equity to the market value of equity.   For a detailed explanation of the 
measures and precise descriptions of the year end dates used, see text. The sample period is 1989-2013. Port 1 (S) is the smallest size, and Port 5 (L) is 
the largest size portfolio. Statistical significance for beta difference, ***, ** and * denotes the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Conventional Estimation Period Panel A: Portfolios formed on  Size 
Variable Port 1 (S) Port 2 Port 3 Port 4 Port 5 (L) 
Number of Firms 808 793 795 793 786 
Monthly Beta 0.989*** 1.049*** 1.076*** 1.051*** 0.890*** 
Weekly Beta 0.710*** 0.788*** 0.856*** 0.919*** 0.871*** 
ΔBeta 0.279*** 0.261*** 0.219*** 0.132*** 0.019* 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.010*** 
AAA 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.030*** 
R_to_TR 2.565*** 1.734*** 1.216*** 0.882*** 0.574*** 
TD/ME 0.332*** 0.290*** 0.367*** 0.396*** 0.297*** 
BE/ME 0.529*** 0.491*** 0.479*** 0.508*** 0.429*** 
Common Estimation Period Panel B: Portfolios formed on  Size 
Variable Port 1 (S) Port 2 Port 3 Port 4 Port 5 (L) 
Number of Firms 758 746 749 747 741 
Monthly Beta 0.978*** 1.048*** 1.068*** 1.052*** 0.894*** 
Weekly Beta 0.698*** 0.781*** 0.841*** 0.921*** 0.873*** 
ΔBeta 0.280*** 0.267*** 0.227*** 0.131*** 0.021** 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 
AAA 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 
R_to_TR 2.457*** 1.809*** 1.274*** 0.874*** 0.582*** 
TD/ME 0.324*** 0.270*** 0.345*** 0.394*** 0.301*** 
BE/ME 0.536*** 0.489*** 0.479*** 0.505*** 0.432*** 
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Table 11: GRS Tests – Based on Size and book-to-market test portfolios 
 
Test Portfolios 
Monthly Weekly Daily 
α  t-stat α  t-stat α  t-stat 
S1_BM1  -0.04 -0.16 -0.01 -0.15 0.00 0.14 
S1_BM2 0.04 0.18 0.01 0.3 0.01 0.60 
S1_BM3 0.09 0.34 0.03 0.52 0.01 0.59 
S2_BM1 -0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.51 
S2_BM2 0.18 0.91 0.05 1.19 0.01 1.45 
S2_BM3 0.11 0.44 0.04 0.64 0.01 0.71 
S3_BM1 -0.09 -0.35 -0.02 -0.42 -0.00 -0.20 
S3_BM2 0.07 0.37 0.03 0.62 0.01 0.85 
S3_BM3 0.21 0.90 0.06 1.05 0.01 1.23 
S4_BM1 0.14 0.62 0.03 0.57 0.01 0.71 
S4_BM2 0.19 1.18 0.05 1.19 0.01 1.40 
S4_BM3 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.17 
S5_BM1 0.21 1.48 0.04 1.09 0.01 1.08 
S5_BM2 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.06 
S5_BM3 0.18 0.93 0.04 0.91 0.01 0.81 
GRS stat 
GRS pval 
0.7074 
(0.776) 
0.6434 
(0.840) 
0.6777 
(0.809) 
𝐑𝟐̅̅̅̅  0.5840 0.5437 0.5142 
?̅? 0.09 0.03 0.01 
Annualised ?̅?  1.04 1.34 1.59 
|?̅?| 0.11 0.03 0.01 
𝐬𝐞̅̅ ̅ 0.0021 0.0005 0.0001 
 
This table reports the results of the time series regression test (GRS test) of the value-
weighted returns of 15 (5×3) intersecting Size and book-to-market (BTM) portfolios on the 
asset pricing model (CAPM) at different frequencies (monthly, weekly and daily). For test 
portfolios S1_BM1 to S5_BM3 represents the 15 portfolios Size and book-to-market (BTM) 
portfolios. . We use five groups for Size (S1, S2, S3, S4 and S5) and three groups for BTM 
(BM1 BM2, BM3). Where S1, S2, S3, S4 and S5 are in the increasing order of size and BM1, 
BM2 and BM3 are in the increasing order of book-to-market ratio. For the GRS test of 
Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989), we run time series regression of the form Rit − Rft =αi 
+βi (Rmt-Rft) + εit where Rit is the return on the test portfolio, Rft is the risk-free rate, Rmt is the 
return on the market portfolio. We test for the rejection of the null hypothesis that all the 
intercept terms are jointly zero using the GRS test. The table reports the (the intercept) and its 
associated t-statistic for the individual portfolios. GRS stat is the GRS test statistic, GRS pval 
is its p-value, 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  is the mean adjusted R-squareds of the regressions, ?̅?  is the mean α, |?̅?| is 
the mean absolute α, 𝑠𝑒̅̅̅ is the mean standard error of the α. The α,α̅ , Annualised ?̅?  and 
|?̅?| are percentages. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denotes the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. The time period is from the beginning of Octorber1989 to the end of 
September 2013. 
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Table 12: GRS Tests – Based on Standard Deviation test portfolios 
Test Portfolios 
Monthly Weekly Daily 
α  t-stat α  t-stat α  t-stat 
SD1 (Lowest) 0.45*** 2.83 0.08** 2.18 0.01* 1.80 
SD2 0.30* 1.88 0.07* 1.77 0.02*** 2.64 
SD3 0.12 0.65 0.00 -0.01 0.01 1.11 
SD4 0.18 1.14 0.03 0.73 0.01 0.68 
SD5 -0.19 -1.11 0.03 0.59 0.01 0.90 
SD6 0.04 0.23 0.04 0.87 0.01 0.74 
SD7 -0.10 -0.51 0.04 0.85 0.01 0.68 
SD8 0.14 0.71 0.03 0.59 0.01 1.34 
SD9 0.17 0.77 0.02 0.43 0.01 0.83 
SD10 -0.32 -1.41 -0.05 -0.75 0.00 0.36 
SD11 -0.42 -1.55 0.00 0.04 -0.00 -0.30 
SD12 (Highest) -0.25 -0.73 -0.20** -2.54 -0.03** -2.36 
GRS stat 
GRS pval 
1.3862 
(0.171) 
1.2043 
(0.274) 
1.4608 
(0.131) 
𝐑𝟐̅̅̅̅  0.6063 0.5685 0.5839 
?̅? 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Annualised ?̅?  0.11 0.39 1.19 
|?̅?| 0.22 0.05 0.01 
𝐬𝐞̅̅ ̅ 0.0020 0.0005 0.0001 
 
This table reports the results of the time series regression test (GRS test) of the value-
weighted returns of 12 standard deviation portfolios on the asset pricing model (CAPM) at 
different frequencies (monthly, weekly and daily). For test portfolios SD1-SD12, the first two 
characters denotes standard deviation. SD1 is the lowest standard deviation portfolio and 
SD12 is the largest standard deviation portfolio. For the GRS test of Gibbons, Ross and 
Shanken (1989), we run time series regression of the form Rit − Rft =αi +βi (Rmt-Rft) + εit 
where Rit is the return on the test portfolio, Rft is the risk-free rate, Rmt is the return on the 
market portfolio. We test for the rejection of the null hypothesis that all the intercept terms 
are jointly zero using the GRS test. The table reports the α (the intercept) and its associated t-
statistic for the individual portfolios. GRS stat is the GRS test statistic, GRS pval is its p-
value, 𝑅2̅̅̅̅  is the mean adjusted R-squareds of the regressions, ?̅? is the mean α, |?̅?|is the mean 
absolute α, 𝑠𝑒̅̅̅ is the mean standard error of the α. The α, α̅ , Annualised ?̅?  and |?̅?| are 
percentages. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denotes the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. The time period is from the beginning of Octorber1989 to the end of September 
2013. 
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Appendix Table A1. Industry definitions 
Mnemonic Datastream description UK category 
BRESR Basic Resources BRESR 
CHMCL Chemicals CHMCL 
CNSTM Construct. & Material CNSTM 
FDBEV Food & Beverage FDBEV 
INSUN Insurance FINSV 
FINSV Financial Services FINSV 
BANKS Banks FINSV 
HLTHC Healthcare HLTHC 
INDGS Ind. Goods & Services INDGS 
MEDIA Media MEDIA 
OILGS Oil & Gas OILGS 
PERHH Personal & Household Goods PERHH 
AUTOP Automobiles & Parts PERHH 
RLEST Real Estate RLEST 
RTAIL Retail RTAIL 
TECNO Technology TECNO 
TELCM Telecommunications TELCM 
TRLES Travel & Leisure TRLES 
UTILS Utilities UTILS 
 
This table shows the basic Datastream Level 3 industry classifications.  Merged groupings 
(needed to give a reasonable number of observations in each industry for the purpose of 
calculating the Modified Jones (1991) measure (see text for a full explanation) are shown in 
bold.  For example, for the UK Insurance and Banks have been merged into Financial 
Services.  Industries that are then dropped from the sample (see text) have been highlighted in 
grey. 
 
 
 
 
